Executive Summary
A multi-national cooperative framework for governmental migration from US-controlled cloud infrastructure to sovereign alternatives.
Classification: OFFICIAL
Audience: Cabinet Ministers, National Security Council, Permanent Secretaries
Action Required: Decision on proceeding with feasibility study and cross-government working group establishment
1. The Existential Threat
Current Dependency
Four American corporations—Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud Platform (GCP), and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI)—collectively control approximately 67% of global cloud infrastructure market (Q3 2025: AWS 29%, Azure 20%, GCP 13%, OCI 2% per Canalys/Synergy Research). Government cloud workloads in the European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia rely heavily on these providers, with sector-specific concentration often exceeding 80% for critical services.
Kill-Switch Mechanisms
Each US cloud provider possesses both the technical capability and legal obligation to comply with US government directives that could:
- Disable or degrade services to foreign government workloads
- Revoke encryption keys rendering data inaccessible
- Exfiltrate data to US intelligence agencies
- Terminate instances and deny service without notice
Legal Authorities
| Authority | Capability |
|---|---|
| CLOUD Act (2018) | Compels US providers to produce data stored abroad regardless of local law |
| FISA Section 702 | Enables warrantless surveillance of non-US persons using US infrastructure |
| Executive Orders | President can designate any foreign entity for technology sanctions |
| National Security Letters | Secret demands for data with gag orders preventing disclosure |
| IEEPA (1977) | Grants President emergency powers to regulate commerce and freeze foreign assets |
Threat Scenarios
Economic Coercion
US threatens cloud service disruption to extract trade concessions, tariff agreements, or policy compliance. "Accept these terms or your benefits system goes offline."
Service Denial
During geopolitical dispute, US disables critical government services: healthcare records, tax systems, benefits administration, emergency services coordination.
Mass Surveillance
US intelligence agencies compel systematic access to government communications, citizen data, policy deliberations, and national security information.
State Ransomware
US holds sovereign data hostage: "Align with our foreign policy position or we encrypt your data and revoke access to your own government systems."
2. The Cooperative Solution
Proposed Approach
A multi-national government cooperative coordinating cloud sovereignty migration via a consortium of non-US suppliers delivering:
- Sovereign cloud infrastructure: Datacenters physically located within each jurisdiction, owned and operated by non-US entities, subject to local law exclusively
- Open-source platforms: Kubernetes, OpenStack, open-source databases—avoiding proprietary US vendor lock-in
- Collaborative architecture: Common reference architecture enabling cross-border cooperation while maintaining national sovereignty
- Shared investment: Pooled R&D, common security frameworks, collective procurement leverage
Governance Model
Each jurisdiction retains full sovereignty over its infrastructure, data, and decision-making. The cooperative provides coordination, not control.
- No central authority or supranational governance
- Common architecture framework established collaboratively
- Bilateral/multilateral working groups for standards alignment
- Threat intelligence sharing and coordinated incident response
- Joint procurement leverage without mandated suppliers
Partner Jurisdictions
Sovereign Supplier Ecosystem
| Region | Example Providers |
|---|---|
| European Union | OVHcloud (France), Hetzner (Germany), Scaleway (France), IONOS (Germany) |
| United Kingdom | Crown Hosting, UK sovereign hyperscale buildout, European providers with UK presence |
| Canada | Canadian sovereign providers, Crown corporation infrastructure |
| Australia | Australian-owned datacenter operators, government-backed sovereign cloud |
3. The Case for Action
Strategic Benefits
- Data Sovereignty: Government data resides only within national borders, subject only to domestic law
- Eliminate Kill-Switch Risk: No US entity can disable, access, or deny service to sovereign infrastructure
- Democratic Resilience: Protect electoral systems, public services, and civil infrastructure from foreign interference
- Economic Growth: Stimulate domestic tech sector, create high-skill jobs, reduce foreign currency outflows
- Strategic Autonomy: Signal to adversaries that critical infrastructure cannot be weaponised
- Operational Continuity: Ensure citizen services cannot be held hostage to foreign policy disputes
Cost-Benefit Summary
| Factor | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Migration Investment | Significant but amortised over 5-7 year programme |
| Risk Mitigation Value | Eliminates existential threat to government operations |
| Economic Multiplier | Domestic investment creates jobs, tax revenue, technical capability |
| Operating Costs | Comparable to current US cloud spend after initial investment |
| Strategic Value | Priceless—sovereignty is not a line item |
The Cost of Inaction
Every day of continued dependence on US cloud infrastructure:
- Deepens technical debt and migration complexity
- Increases leverage available to adversarial actors
- Signals to the US administration that coercion is cost-free
- Risks catastrophic service denial during a crisis when alternative paths are unavailable
4. Recommendations
Immediate Actions Requested
- Commission independent review of this proposal by NAO (costs), NCSC (security), and IPA (deliverability) before any commitment. This is a policy proposal requiring independent validation, not a pre-approved business case.
- Request NCSC/JIC threat assessment to validate or refute the threat scenarios and probability ratings presented in this document with classified intelligence.
- Approve establishment of cross-government working group with mandate to assess current cloud dependency and develop sovereign migration strategy.
- Authorise diplomatic engagement with EU, Canada, and Australia counterparts to explore cooperative framework participation. No commitments currently exist.
- Allocate planning budget for detailed feasibility study and proof-of-concept pilot programme (subject to independent review findings).
Programme Timeline Overview
Phase 0: Preparation & Assessment
Week 0-2 (Peacetime: Months 1-6)
Risk assessment, working group establishment, diplomatic engagement, feasibility study
Phase 1: Pilot Migration
Week 2-8 (Peacetime: Months 6-18)
Low-risk workload migration, proof of concept, supplier evaluation, architecture validation
Phase 2: Platform Foundation
Week 8-14 (Peacetime: Months 18-30)
Core platform buildout, security hardening, operational capability establishment
Phase 3-4: Migration Waves
Week 14-24 (Peacetime: Months 30-66)
Systematic migration of government workloads by criticality and complexity
Phase 5-6: Optimisation & Exit
Week 24+ (Peacetime: Months 66-84)
Performance tuning, cost optimisation, complete US cloud decommissioning
(Peacetime: 5-7 Years / 60-84 Months)
This is a matter of national security,
democratic resilience, and sovereign survival.
The threat is real, present, and growing.
The solution is achievable through cooperation.